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Abstract 
Subjects rendered judgments regarding the power of the participants in a series of 
conflictual circumstances where an adversary threatened a target. These situations manipulated 
four independent variables: (a) the adversary's capacity to damage the target's interests, (6) the 
adversary's probability of actually attacking, (c) the target's ability to block the impending attack, 
and (d) the target's capacity to retaliate. Results showed that all of the independent variables 
affected the subjects' judgments of the adversary's power, while three of them (damage, 
blockage, and retaliation) affected judgments of the target's power. Differences in the predictive 
equations for judgments of adversary power and target power were noted, and a theoretical 
model was formulated to explain these differences. This model, cast in terms of the patterns of 
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Perceptions of Power in Conflict Situations 
General Erwin Rommel arrived in North Africa in February, 1941, to assume command 
of the German panzer forces. At that time, the Afrika Korps had few tanks, and Rommel, 
concerned with this deficiency, quickly ordered his workshops to fabricate dummy tank frames 
suitable for mounting on a Volkswagen chassis. These vehicles, which included devices to churn 
up trailing clouds of dust, created the impression of enormous armored strength when viewed at 
a distance across the arid desert terrain (Lewin, 1968). The astute German commander 
understood the tactical importance of power perception. In adversary situations involving 
confrontations of force, the mere appearance of strength can rival the real thing.  
What information does an individual use in assessing the strength of an adversary? Are 
certain data more central than others in shaping such impressions? These are important questions 
because judgments about power are crucial in situations of conflict. Tactical decisions often 
hinge on judgments about relative power, and the outcome of a clash may depend on the 
accuracy of these judgments. Any misjudgment of an opponent's true capabilities—either an 
underestimate or an overestimate—may create untoward consequences. Thus, if an opponent can 
manipulate a target's impression of their relative power capabilities, he can probably affect the 
target's reaction. 
The research reported in this article treats power perceptions in conflictual encounters 
where coercion and force are used. Focusing on confrontations between antagonists who can 
obstruct one another's valued outcomes, this research investigates factors that determine 
impressions of power. 
Previous Research on Power Perception 
PERCEPTION OF POWER IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS                                4 
 
Previous research on the perception of power has been narrow in scope, and there 
apparently exists no broad-based theory of attributed power. In approaching the available 
literature, however, it is useful to think in terms of a conflictual situation involving a sequence of 
attack and counterattack. As Swingle (1970) noted, persons in severe discord may define the 
interaction in terms of the offensive and defensive capabilities of the opposing parties. Offensive 
potential refers to the capacity of one opponent to initiate attacks against the interests of another. 
Existing literature on power perception distinguishes between the magnitude of damage that an 
attacker can potentially inflict on the target and his probability of actually exercising control over 
the target. In contrast, defensive potential denotes the target's ability to block the attacker's 
efforts and to retaliate after the aggressor has struck an initial blow. All of these variables—
damage, probability, blockage, and retaliation—characterize situations of conflict and 
consequently may affect perceptions of power. 
Previous research offers no more than limited evidence regarding the effects of the four 
variables (damage, probability, blockage, and retaliation) on attributed power. The clearest 
evidence concerns damage, which indexes the extent to which an adversary can exercise control 
over the outcomes valuable to the target. Several studies have found that the greater the damage 
an antagonist can inflict, the more powerful he is judged to be. Employing diverse measures of 
attributed power, studies by Teger (1970), Johnson and Ewens 
(1971), and Michener, Griffith, and Palmer (1971) have demonstrated this effect for individual 
opponents. The same effect holds for conflictual situations in which the stimulus objects are 
coalitions rather than lone individuals (Michener & Zeller, 1972). And Chu (1966) reported 
similar results for nonhuman adversaries capable of damaging the target person. 
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Other research shows that a second factor, the probability that the antagonist will actually 
lambaste the target, also affects ascribed power. Schelling (1960) has argued that the 
manipulation of perceived probability (as by intentionally committing oneself to an apparently 
irrevocable line of action) constitutes an important tactic in bargaining. Moreover, various 
empirical studies (Benton, Gelber, Kelley, & Liebling, 1969; Chu, 1966; Faley & Tedeschi, 
1971; Horai, Haber, Tedeschi, & Smith, 1970) indicate that persons impute more potency to 
opponents having a high likelihood of using their offensive capabilities than to those manifesting 
a lower likelihood. 
But these two factors, damage and probability, characterize only the aggressor's abilities, 
not the target's. Assessments of an adversary's power (and of the target's own power) may reflect 
not only what the adversary can and/or will do but also the defensive ripostes possible in the 
situation. Surprisingly, the capacity to block attacks has apparently received little attention as a 
factor affecting ascribed power. Nevertheless, the present conceptualization of conflictual 
encounters as involving both offense and defense implies that blockage should affect imputed 
power. Blockage indicates the extent to which the target can neutralize an attack and retain 
control of outcomes he values. The target is likely to view an easily neutralized adversary as less 
powerful than one who cannot be checked. 
A final factor, the target's ability to retaliate, may also color judgments of power, 
although one might speculate that it influences impressions of the target's power more than 
impressions of the adversary's. Research by Tedeschi, Bonoma, and Novinson (1970), which 
used the potency dimension of the semantic differential scale as a measure of attributed power, 
found that subjects ascribed greater potency to targets who wielded retaliatory capacity than to 
those who did not, although inconclusive results for the control group render these findings 
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provisional. One may nevertheless hypothesize that in general the capacity to retaliate affects 
perceived power. Because retaliation refers to the target's ability to exert control over outcomes 
valuable to the adversary, more power may be ascribed to the adversary under low retaliation 
than under high; similarly, the target of the attack should be adjudged stronger under high 
retaliation than under low. 
The present study extends previous work on the perception of power. Limited to 
situations involving an attacker and a target, it investigates how persons syncretize information 
relevant to power. That is, it inquires how persons combine diverse information in arriving at 
judgments of power. Specifically, it broaches the following questions: (a) Do each of the four 
independent variables—damage, probability, blockage, and retaliation—affect the amount of 
power ascribed to the adversary? (b) Do they also affect assessments of the target's power? (c) 
Do the independent variables affect each of these judgments in the same way? That is, are the 
predictive equations for the target's power and the adversary's power similar? (d) Are there some 
underlying commonalities in the judgments of the adversary's and the target's power that provide 
a basis for a general theory of power perception? 
Method 
Subjects 
 This study employed a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design (i.e., Damage X Probability X 
Blockage X Retaliation). The sample consisted of 288 undergraduates at the University of 
Wisconsin. Half of the subjects were male and half were female, and they represented the four 
undergraduate levels (freshman, sophomore, junior, senior) approximately in proportion to 
enrollment. As a group, the subjects possessed no special knowledge about social power or about 
perceptions of power. Data collection occurred in five group-administered sessions of varying 
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size. Subjects were randomly assigned to the 16 experimental treatments with the constraint that 
equal numbers of males and females (i.e., 9 of each) appear in each cell of the design. 
Materials  
 Each subject read a set of four situations; these incorporated the manipulations of the 
independent variables. Each situation portrayed a conflictual relationship between two parties—
that is, an adversary on the attack and a target on the defense. Subjects viewed the situation from 
the standpoint of the target in the confrontation. Each situation conformed to a standard format, 
as follows: The adversary had the capability either to destroy 90% of some valued outcome (high 
damage) or to destroy 10% of that outcome (low damage). Simultaneously, there was either a 
90% chance that the adversary would actually attempt to carry out the destruction (high 
probability) or a 10% chance (low probability). In turn, the target had either a 90% chance of 
blocking the attack (high blockage) or a 10% ' chance (low blockage). Moreover, he could 
retaliate against the adversary by destroying either 90% of an outcome valued by the adversary 
(high retaliation) or 10% of that outcome (low retaliation). 
While morphologically identical, the four stimulus situations differed in their specific content. 
One depicted a confrontation between a salesman and his regional manager, where the manager 
could reduce the salesman's commission-based income by either 10% or 90% (depending on 
experimental treatment) and where there was either a 10% or a 90% probability that he would 
actually do so. On the other hand, the salesman had either a 10% or a 90% chance of blocking 
the manager's onslaught by appealing to a higher official in the organization, and he could 
retaliate by moving to another company and taking either 10% or 90% of his customers with 
him, thereby hurting the manager's sales record. 
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A second situation described an altercation between a newspaper editor and a local judge. 
The judge could obstruct newspaper coverage of an important trial, and the editor could block 
the judge's action by a lawsuit and retaliate by publishing articles that would diminish the judge's 
chances of reelection. Similarly, a third situation delineated a conflict between two countries 
with military capabilities, while the fourth treated a dispute between two congressmen where 
passage of a bill and campaign support were at stake. 
Dependent Measures  
Each subject was assigned to only one experimental treatment in the 16-cell factorial 
design for all four stimulus situations. The sequential ordering in which subjects read the four 
situations was randomized. The subjects in the role of the target responded by recording their 
impressions of the adversary's power and the target's power (i.e., their own power) in each 
situation. Specifically, they provided separate ratings for the adversary and the target on various 
semantic differential items, each with 9-point scales. These items, selected on the basis of face 
validity and usage in previous studies of power perception (Heise, 1970; Johnson & Ewens, 
1971; Pruitt & Johnson, 1970), included: powerful-powerless, threatening-not threatening, 
potent-not potent, dominant-submissive, tenacious-yielding, aggressive-nonaggressive, and 
attacking-not attacking. Besides completing the semantic differentials, subjects concurrently 
indicated (on 9-point scales) their level of confidence in their ratings for the adversary and the 
target. 
For each of the four stimulus situations, the seven semantic differential scores for the 
adversary were added (i.e., unit weighted) to yield an adversary power score, while those for the 
target were summed to obtain a target power score. Using these summative scales as dependent 
variables, a repeated measures analysis of variance showed that there were negligible differences 
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between the four situations and no significant interactions between situations and the four 
independent variables (i.e., damage, probability, blockage, and retaliation); this is not surprising, 
of course, because the four situations were designed to be structurally isomorphic. 
Next, since any given subject was in the same experimental treatment for all four 
situations, the four scores for the adversary's power (i.e., one score for each situation) were 
summed to create a single score, and the four scores for the target's power were summed to 
create a single score. Thus, for purposes of data analysis, this study includes two major 
dependent variables, termed adversary power and target power.  
Data from the present sample indicated that each of these dependent variables achieved a 
high level of reliability (internal consistency), Cronbach’s alpha for adversary power was .941, 










 Table 1 presents the mean values for adversary power as a function of the four 
orthogonally manipulated independent variables (i.e., damage, probability, blockage, and 
retaliation). An analysis of variance indicates significant main effects for each of the independent 
variables. Adversary power is greater under high damage than under low (𝐹𝐹 = 26.3S, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 1/272, 
𝑝𝑝 < .001), greater under high probability than under low (𝐹𝐹 = 158.93, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 1/272, 𝑝𝑝 <.00l), 
greater under low blockage than under high (𝐹𝐹 = 33.88, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 1/272, 𝑝𝑝 < .001), and greater under 
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low retaliation than under high (𝐹𝐹 = 31.84, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 1/272, 𝑝𝑝 < .001). Stated simply, power ascribed 
to an adversary is higher when the adversary can and does wreak severe damage and when the 
target cannot intercept the assault or do much in response. 
 Some of these findings correspond to those of earlier studies. The damage main effect 
corroborates that found by Michener and Zeller (1972) as well as that reported by Johnson and 
Ewens (1971). Moreover, the probability main effect replicates the finding reported by Benton et 
al. (1969), where probability was manipulated by varying the actual frequency of power usage. 
Similar probability effects emerged in the study by Horai et al. (1970). This correspondence 
between the present findings and earlier findings deserves notice for two reasons. First, the 
present findings replicate previous discoveries, which is important for the accumulation of 
reliable scientific information. Second, this correspondence strengthens confidence in the 
methodology used here. Further evidence for the adequacy of the present procedures comes from 
the subjects' reports of their own confidence in their ratings. Although the four independent 
variables had no impact on the confidence scores, the subjects expressed considerable confidence 
in their ratings of both the adversary and the target. On a 9-point scale the mean confidence for 
the target's ratings was 6.0 ("moderately confident"), while that for the adversary's ratings was 
6.4. 
 Considered jointly, the four independent variables are important determinants of the 
power attributed to the adversary. The coefficient of determination (R2) is .458. Especially 
noteworthy is the effect of probability, which alone accounts for 29.1% of the variance in 
adversary power. The surprising magnitude of this effect imparts an important lesson regarding 
the tactical use of power: The probable deployment of a power base, regardless of the magnitude 
of damage implied, affects judgments of power in a pivotal fashion.  
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 Raven and Kruglanski (1970) advanced a useful distinction between possessing a power 
base, threatening to use the power base, and actually using the base. The present findings suggest 
that the threatened likelihood of using a coercive power base—rather than mere possession of the 
resource—exerts a great impact on attributed power. Even persons who are outgunned or trapped 
in low-power positions can manipulate the power attributed to them by vigorously activating (or 
pretending to activate) their limited resources. The consequences for impression management 
seem obvious, given that one can frequently fake the probability of initiating action with relative 
ease. 
Target Power 
 The four independent variables not only affect judgments regarding the adversary's 
power, but they also determine the power ascribed to the target. Table 2 presents the mean values 
for target power as a function of the independent variables. Interestingly, the pattern of effects 
differs from that for adversary power. The analysis of variance for the target power scores 
reveals a significant damage main effect (𝐹𝐹 = 13.02, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 1/272, 𝑝𝑝 < .001), a significant 
blockage main effect (𝐹𝐹 = 36.71, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑= 1/272, 𝑝𝑝 < .001), and a significant retaliation main effect 
(𝐹𝐹 = 27.70, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 1/272, 𝑝𝑝  < .001). No significant effect emerges for probability (𝐹𝐹 < 1). Target 
power is greater under low damage than under high, greater under high blockage than under low, 
and greater under high retaliation than under low. These independent variables are moderate 
determinants of target power, as indicated by the coefficient of determination 
(R2 = .212).  
 Notice that the various independent variables affect both adversary power and target 
power, but the pattern of effects is different. This difference emerges clearly in a comparison of 
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the regression equations for the two dependent variables. The equation for adversary power (AP) 
is: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 =  +.22𝐷𝐷 +  .54𝐴𝐴 −  .25𝐵𝐵 −  .24𝑅𝑅 + 𝑒𝑒1, [1] 
while that for target power (TP) is: 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 =  −.19𝐷𝐷 +  .02𝐴𝐴 +  .32𝐵𝐵 +  .28𝑅𝑅 +  𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦. [2] 
 In these equations the independent variables are D (damage), P (probability), B 
(blockage), and R (retaliation). The symbols 𝑒𝑒1 and 𝑒𝑒2 designate stochastic disturbance terms. 
Since all of the variables in these equations are standardized and the independent variables are 
uncorrelated, the coefficients in each equation (commonly called "path coefficients") indicate the 
relative contributions of the various independent variables. 
 Equations 1 and 2 assume an underlying causal model in which adversary power is not a 
cause of target power and target power is not a cause of adversary power. Although the data 
show a significant zero-order correlation between adversary power and target power (𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = -
.193), this correlation should not be construed as evidence that adversary power causes target 
power, or vice versa. In fact, nearly all of the covariation between the two dependent variables is 
produced by the independent variables, as indicated by the fact that the partial correlation 
between adversary power and target power, holding constant the four independent variables, is 
virtually zero (𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴.𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = — .023,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛). Thus, this test supports a model in which the direct 
causal paths between the two dependent variables are essentially zero. 
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 Although the independent variables affect both adversary power and target power, they 
affect these outcomes differently. This is shown by the pattern of algebraic signs, which is 
different in Equation 1 and Equation 2. Thus, blockage and retaliation increase target power but 
reduce adversary power. Damage augments adversary power but diminishes target power. Some 
of these empirical findings are intuitively obvious, but others are not. Damage, for instance, 
might be expected to increase adversary power, but why should it have any effect on target 
power? And while retaliation plausibly determines the power ascribed to the target (who actually 
wields the retaliatory capacity), why does it affect adversary power? 
Discussion 
 To explain the pattern of findings in Equations 1 and 2, a theoretical-construct model is 
needed. The remainder of this article, therefore, formulates a generalized model of power 
perception in conflict situations. Although advanced post-factum, this theory not only subsumes 








A Theory of Power Perception  
 The conflictual situations in the present study had several elements in common. In all 
cases there were two participants, an adversary and a target. And in all cases, various outcomes 
were at stake. Some of these outcomes were valuable to the target, while others were valuable to 
the adversary. For purposes of understanding Equations 1 and 2, it is useful to construe the four 
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independent variables (damage, probability, blockage, and retaliation) as indexes of control over 
these valued outcomes. 
 Figure 1 represents the structure common to the four situations. It depicts the two 
participants (target and adversary) and an outcome valuable to each. The valuable outcomes, of 
course, differed from situation to situation. In one situation, a salesman valued his commission-
based income, while the salesman's manager wanted to retain the company's customers; in 
another situation, a newspaper editor wanted the opportunity to cover a trial, while the opposing 
judge valued his chances of reelection to office. Figure 1 delineates a situation where both 
participants exercise some control over both outcomes. This structure accords with the four 
stimulus situations viewed by the experimental subjects. In essence, the damage and probability 
variables indicate the extent of the adversary's control over the outcome valued by the target; the 
blockage variable specifies the extent of the target's control over the outcome valuable to 
himself; and the retaliation variable indexes the target's control over the outcome valued by the 
adversary. 
 Interestingly, Figure 1 also reveals that as a logical possibility, the adversary could 
exercise control over the outcome valuable to himself. Although the stimulus situations in the 
present study provided no information about this linkage, the patterns of control in Figure 1 
convey what it might involve (one possibility, for instance, being "counterblockage," or the 
extent to which the adversary can obstruct the retaliatory efforts of the target). 
 Given the patterns of control depicted in Figure 1, a theory to explain the causal pattern 
in Equations 1 and 2 requires only one postulate: If a participant in a conflictual situation 
increases his control over any valued outcome (i.e., either an outcome that he values or an 
outcome that his antagonist values), the power attributed to him increases, and the power 
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attributed to the other person decreases. Note that control and power are not the same thing. A 
man, for instance, may control many outcomes, but he remains powerless if these outcomes are 
not valuable to someone. 
 Predictions derived from this postulate are elaborated in Figure 2. These derivations 
indicate how changes in control over outcomes affect attributed power. For example, an increase 
(from .1 to .9) in the target's control over the outcome valued by the target would result in an 
increase ( + ) in the power ascribed to the target and in a decrease ( —) in the power ascribed to 
the adversary; analogously, an increase in the adversary's control over the outcome valued by the 
target would result in a decrease ( —) in the power ascribed to the target and in an increase ( + ) 
in the power ascribed to the adversary; and so on. 
  
 
  Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
 
 In essence, the predictions summarized in Figure 2 specify the form of the equations for 
adversary power and target power. Using the independent variables of D (damage), P 
(probability), B (blockage), and R (retaliation), the equation for adversary power (AP) becomes: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = + 𝐷𝐷 + 𝐴𝐴 − 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑅𝑅,      [3] 
while that for target power (TP) becomes: 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 = −𝐷𝐷 − 𝐴𝐴 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑅𝑅        [4] 
Since the theory predicts only the direction (not the magnitude) of the effects for the independent 
variables, no numerical coefficients are included in these equations. 
 Keeping in mind that the theory is post-factum (and therefore cannot be "proved" by the 
present data), compare the theoretical Equation 3 with the empirical Equation 1 (for adversary 
power), and compare the theoretical Equation 4 with the empirical Equation 2 (for target power). 
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The concordance of signs is striking, and the only disparity occurs for the effect of probability on 
target power, where the predicted relationship is negative but the empirical data show a 
nonsignificant positive relationship. All other signs are consistent. 
Further Issues in Power Perception 
 The theory has been advanced to explain why Equations 1 and 2 assume the form they 
do. Since one cannot test a theory on the same data used to formulate it, future research should 
attempt a direct assessment. Ideally, a test of the theory would include data on all four patterns of 
control represented by the theory (see Figure 1). As indicated earlier, the present study includes 
no empirical data on one of these linkages (i.e., the adversary's control over outcomes valuable to 
him), and one of the theory's virtues is to point to this gap. 
 Although cast at a high level of generality, the theory is narrow in scope because it 
applies only to power perceptions in conflictual situations. But a parallel theory of power 
perception, stressing control over valued outcomes, might apply to cooperative, nonadversary 
relationships. Expansion in this direction seems possible. 
 The theory might also be extended to incorporate variations in value. Recent research by 
Rothbart (1970) showed that the value of the outcomes in an interaction may affect the 
perception of threat and power. And the formulation of power tactics derived from social 
exchange theory (Michener & Schwertfeger, 1972; Michener & Suchner, 1972) similarly stresses 
the value of outcomes. If the target of an attack, for instance, suddenly stopped caring about an 
outcome jeopardized by the adversary (i.e., used the tactic of "withdrawal"), then the adversary 
would effectively exercise less control over those outcomes valued in the interaction, and 
consequently he would be viewed as less powerful. The present study did not experimentally 
manipulate the values of the outcomes at stake, and the theory implicitly assumes that these 
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values are fixed and unchanging. Future elaborations of the theory, however, might explicitly 
incorporate differences in outcome values. 
 Finally, the role of probability in the perception of power requires further clarification. 
Probability should be treated as conceptually distinct from damage capability because as earlier 
research has shown, the fact that someone possesses a coercive power base does not necessarily 
imply he will actually deploy it (Michener & Cohen, 1973; Michener & Lawler, 1971). The 
present empirical results indicate that although the adversary's probability of attacking is an 
important determinant of adversary power, it has virtually no impact on target power. This may 
have occurred because the subjects viewed the situations from the target's role. Nevertheless, this 
is the only point where the theory cannot reproduce the empirical findings, and it therefore poses 
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Table 1. Mean Scores for Adversary Power 
  
Table 2. Mean Scores for Target Power 
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Figure 1. Representation of patterns of control by adversary and target. 
Representation of Patterns of Control 
 
Figure 2. Predictions regarding adversary’s power and target’s power from the pattern of control.  
Predictions from Patterns of Control 
 
